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When looked at individually there is little reason to think that economists lack integrity and are 
dishonest. Yet, when we look at academic papers written by economists we can see biases. This paper 
tries to reconcile these two observations by arguing that the constraints the profession sets on permitted 
practices are loose enough to allow economists to maintain their biases while conforming to the mores of 
their profession. There is little reason to think that economics is worse in this respect than some other 
fields.
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Honesty and Integrity in Economics 
Thomas Mayer 
The essence of scientific method is honesty; compared to the role that honesty plays in the 
progress of science the issues that philosophers of science argue about, such as falsificationism or the 
realisticness of assumptions are merely technical details. If scientists cannot rely on the honesty of their 
colleagues then it is hard to see how science can progress. Economists who want to enhance the 
scientific status of economics should therefore pay some attention to the seemingly simplistic issue of the 
honesty of economists, and not focus entirely on such “sophisticated” issues as the role of  models and 
status of unrealistic assumptions. 
Since just about all economists agree that honesty is desirable this requires no discussion. What 
does need discussion is just how honest economists are, and what can be done to enhance their 
honesty. Given the high pay-off that publication has for academic economists, and the extent to which 
dishonesty can enhance the prospect of publication in a prestigious journal, a profession that takes as one 
of its core propositions that people maximize utility should ask whether its members sometimes maximize 
utility by being dishonest.  In trying to answer these questions I will for two reasons focus on academic 
economists. First, since they unlike most government and business economists publish their research 
more information on their research is available. Second, I have spent most of my career as an academic 
economist, and have had only a short and outdated experience as a government economist. And in 
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discussing the extent of dishonesty the limited availability of hard evidence forces one to rely in good part 
on one’s impressions and “feel”.  
I 
        One way in which an academic economist can be dishonest is to accept bribes from 
students to raise their grades. It seems likely that this is extremely rare because so few cases of it have 
been exposed, even though the risk of exposure is high. A student who has paid a bribe may, perhaps 
while drunk, tell other students about it, and as these tell still others deans and department chairs hear 
about it. This danger of exposure is sufficient to explain the rarity of bribes, though, of course, conscience 
and a sense of integrity provide equally good explanations, and there is no way of choosing between 
these explanations.  
  Plagiarism, in its flagrant form of copying some else’s work, also seems rare;  I can recall 
reading about only two confirmed cases of it in the almost sixty years I have spent as an economist. 
Again, risk of exposure provides a plausible explanation. Conscience does so too, though I would guess 
that fear of exposure is the stronger force. “Soft” plagiarism in the sense of making unacknowledged use 
of someone else’s ideas is probably much more common, both because it is much less likely to be 
detected (and the punishment if detected is apt to be much less), and because it being less heinous, 
one’s conscience will protest less, if only because the line between acceptable use of the literature and 
soft plagiarism is fuzzy. Similarly, though it is unethical, one is not likely to seriously damage one’s career 
by failing to mention, or by mentioning only in a dismissive footnote, if in the process of writing one’s 
paper one discovered that the idea is not new. It should, however generate pangs of conscience. 
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   There have been many reports recently of physicians accepting pay-offs from drug 
companies to induce them to prescribe certain drugs. That sort of thing, or something broadly similar to it, 
is not entirely unknown in academia with respect to the choice of textbooks, but it seems rather minor.
1 
And paying to influence the results of academic studies, or inducing prestigious physicians to put their 
names on papers that were written by company employees, something which is hardly unknown in drug-
effectiveness studies (see Harris, 2008), is not a problem in economics.
2 Judge Jack Weinstein 
concluded that: “The odds are 5.3 times greater that commercially funded studies will conclude that the 
sponsor’s drug is the treatment of choice compared to noncommercially funded studies of exactly the 
same drug.” (cited in Liptak, 2008, p. A-13”) The nearest counterpart to that in economics is the strong 
tendency of papers to reach conclusions that are consonant with those of the author’s previous papers, an 
issue discussed below.  
But we should not pride ourselves on so stalwartly adhering to the honorable course. You can reject 
a bribe only if you have been offered one, and I doubt that there are many potential paymasters who care 
enough about the outcome of our studies to offer us a bribe. (Government economists, the results of 
                                         
1  Publisher pays academics to comment on drafts of textbooks, and apparently sometimes select these referees in the hope 
that this will induce them to adopt the book in their own classes. But the payment a referee receives constitutes a bribe only to 
the extent that it exceeds the market price for the effort involved, and it is far from clear that this is generally so. And even if 
publishers select certain referees because there is a large potential market for the book at their schools that is still not bribery 
unless the payment induces the teacher to adopt that book. 
   
2 But not entirely unknown. I was once approached by the economist for a firm to produce a study the contents of which he 
would more or less provide, but that would carry my academic label.    
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whose studies can sometimes have a substantial influence on the profitability of a firm, are in a different 
position. But here the costs of being caught are high.)  
A greater temptation at least for academic economists is to produce a publishable paper through 
outright cheating by making up their data or lying about the results they obtained. The high returns to 
publication in terms of salary increases, chances of tenure, offers from other schools and prestige make 
this tempting. If caught the punishment is likely to be high. But the risk of being caught is not all that 
great. While many journals require authors to make their data available, apparently this requirement is 
frequently ignored. And if subsequent to publication someone asks for the data a cheater could always 
claim to have lost them, or if someone does obtain the data and is unable to duplicate the author’s 
results, he could always claim that his misreporting of the results is just due to carelessness. When 
working with small samples a keypunch “error” or the arbitrary omission of a few outliers can work 
wonders on one’s R
2 and regression coefficients. And while there is a danger that an R.A. may blow the 
whistle, the dependence of graduate students on faculty members’ goodwill reduces this danger. 
 No data on such cheating are available, but my guess is that it is rare, or at least unusual. If it 
were common one would hear more complaints about the inability to reproduce a previous author’s 
results. Moreover, my general impression of my colleagues is that they would not stoop to such a 
practice. A related, though not quite as heineous, and hence perhaps less infrequent, practice is suppress 
unfavorable evidence and important qualifications to the results. More on that later. 
  For government economists it is also tempting to manufacture results that please their 
superiors. Despite this our data do not seem to be biased. In part this may be due to the difficulty of 
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manipulating data when there may be many potential whistle-blowers involved in generating them. 
However, whistle blowing is not such a great deterrence to a sequence of small, individually more or less 
arbitrary decisions, all going one way that sum to serious distortions.  But a law, the Data Quality Act, 
that makes the government liable to damage suits by users of its data may also help, Beyond that we 
owe a great debt to government economists for protecting of the integrity of our data.  
A business economist who makes up her results to please her clients is sooner or later likely to 
lose her reputation, though perhaps not soon enough to make this unprofitable. I know of no evidence on 
how well business economists resist this temptation. In situations where a business economist acts as an 
acknowledged spokesperson and is expected to present the firm’s line, or acknowledges being a hired 
gun, doing so is legitimate unless it involves making extraordinarily bizarre statements.  
II 
However, when looked at from another angle there is evidence that suggests dishonesty, or at least 
a certain lack of integrity, on the part of academic economists. This is that the results that their papers 
reach are uncannily consistent with the results that they reached in their previous papers. As Don Patinkin 
(1972, p. 142)  wrote during  the monetarist-Keynesian debate: “ I will begin to believe in economics as a 
science when out of Yale there comes an empirical Ph.D. thesis  demonstrating the supremacy of 
monetary policy in some historical episode and out of Chicago one demonstrating the supremacy of fiscal 
policy.” If economists let the facts speak freely so that the chips fall where they may, shouldn’t the 
probability that the empirical results of a paper support hypothesis A be no greater for an economist 
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whose previous papers supported A than for one whose previous papers supported the rival hypothesis 
B? 
Not necessarily. One possible explanation is that the results are driven by the econometric methods 
(e.g. structural models vs. calibration) or types of data, (e.g. time series vs. cross-section) used, and that 
an author tends to use the same methods and data in all her work on a certain theory. But even if that is 
so, this does not necessarily mean that economists are unbiased. The reason economist A uses a 
structural model and economist B calibration methods could be, not considerations of econometric theory, 
but that structural models tend to lead to the results that A favors and calibration methods to the results 
that B favors. 
 Another possibility is that all of A‘s empirical results are based on a certain premise that B rejects, 
such as wage stickiness, or even on a difference in world views, for example on the acceptance or 
rejection of what Thomas Sowell (2007) calls “the tragic vision”. That may well account for some of the 
consistency between an economist’s new and previous results, but only for some of it. For example, there 
was no such dominating premise or world view in important aspects of the monetarist-Keynesian 
controversy, nor is it an explanation for the consistency with which some economists find that the excess 
burden of taxes is higher than others do. 
This suggests that bias does play a significant role in disagreements among economists. Such a 
bias could be ideological, or simply a reluctance to admit that one’s previous results are wrong, or more 
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generally, the result of what psychologists call confirmation bias.
3 It  could also be the result of loyalty to 
a particular school of thought, a loyalty probably forged in graduate school, or just an attitude of “my mind 
is made up don’t bother me with the facts.”
4 
  Does such a bias imply dishonesty or at least a lack of sufficient intellectual integrity? This 
depends on the definition of dishonesty and integrity. If these terms are defined broadly it does so since 
economists claim at least implicitly that their results are unbiased. But compare the following three cases: 
In one an economist tells an outright lie, for example she states that her results are robust to changes in 
the sample period when she knows that they are not. In the second she does not make such a 
statement, but merely refrains from claiming that they are robust, and does not tell readers that she found 
that they no longer hold if some regressors, whose validity is hard to determine, are included. In the third 
case she does not test for robustness because she is afraid of what she would find. 
While in the first case she is obviously being dishonest, the second case where she does not say 
anything about robustness is less clear. The reader is not told an obvious lie, but he is not being told the 
whole truth when he has a reasonable expectation that he is. It is a reasonable expectation because 
academic economists and most government economists are supposed to be searchers for the truth, not 
attorneys making a case. Hence, even if one does not want to call it outright dishonesty it is fair to treat it 
                                         
3  For empirical evidence of substantial ideological bias in economics see Fuchs et al ( 1998); for evidence of relatively little 
ideological bias see Mayer (2001b). Neither study tested for a bias in the sense of trying too hard to confirm one’s previous 
results. 
4 Elsewhere, (Mayer, 1998), I provide an example, the debate about the desirability of a stable monetary growth rate rule, that 
illustrates the pernicious influence of schools in economics. 
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as a lack of intellectual integrity. The third case (simply not checking for robustness out of fear of what 
would turn up) is harder to classify. But all that shows is that the line between what is morally right and 
what is morally wrong is sometimes fuzzy, surely a familiar point. 
Similarly, an economist who uses a technique or a line of reasoning that he knows to be wrong is 
clearly dishonest, but  an economist who uses one that he has not bothered to examine critically because 
it is an accepted procedure does not consider himself - and should not be considered - dishonest. And if 
my contention in the following section, that some of our accepted procedures allow economists too much 
leeway, is correct, this could explain the co-existence of individually honest economists and biased 
results. I do not mean to imply that these procedures allow every research project to reach the 
conclusions the researcher desires; but in many cases they allow us to indulge in our biases.  
III 
One of these procedures to confuse statistical and economic significance, so that finding that x 
affects y at the 5 percent significance level seems like an important contribution, even when the size of 
the effect is trivial.
 How common is this?  McCloskey (2008) and Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) argue that 
it is very common, for which they have been criticized by Hoover and Siegler (2008a and b). But even if 
it occurs only infrequently that is too much.  
  A related illegitimate procedure is the upside-down use of significance tests, that is to 
imply that if you have shown that a certain claim, e.g., that x affects y is not confirmed at the 5 percent 
significance level, you have thereby shown that x does not affect y, thus waving away the possibility that 
what is at fault is not the hypothesis but the small size of your sample. Perhaps we should think of 
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significance tests as being just as much tests of the adequacy of sample size as of the validity of the 
hypothesis. Actually, it is a joint test of both. If a hypothesis is not confirmed at the 5 percent level all we 
can conclude is that either (or both) the hypothesis is false or that the sample is too small. Hence, to say 
something about the hypothesis we have to make a more or less subjective judgment about the adequacy 
of the sample. And that brings back into the subjectivism that significance tests were intended to avoid. 
One context in which this error frequently occurs is in deciding whether to adjust the data for 
heterogeneity because the assumption of normalcy cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. A similar 
thing applies to adjustments for unit roots. (See Mayer, 2001a; Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008).  
However, when applied consistently as seems common, and not only when it supports the author’s 
results, the use of upside-down significance tests does not on average bias the results towards those that 
the researcher wants to come up with, and therefore cannot account for the frequency with which the 
results of new studies cohere with those of the author’s previous studies. 
Another procedure is data mining.
5 If my initial regressions do not confirm my hypothesis I can 
simply make some changes, such as switching the regression equation from natural numbers to logs, 
changing the definitions of a variable, e.g., using M-1 instead of M-2 as my regressor, or else I can add 
or subtract auxiliary regressors, until I get the values of the regression coefficients that I want. In a classic 
example Edward Leamer (1978) showed how the estimated effect of capital punishment on the homicide 
rate can be made to vary from strongly negative to positive by selecting particular auxiliary regressors. 
                                         
5 For further discussions of these issues see the symposium on data mining in the June 2000 issue (vol. 7) of the Journal of 
Economic Methodology 
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It is tempting to conclude that this sort of fishing for desired results is dishonest and should be 
eliminated. But the problem lies in the words “this sort”. There is an observationally equivalent type of 
data mining, or perhaps one should say an observationally equivalent motive for data mining that is not 
only honest, but often necessary. (See Hoover and Perez, 2000.) This arises from the fact that often the 
theoretical terms of economic theory cannot be translated unequivocally into measureable variables. For 
example, does the term “money” as used by the quantity theory correspond to M-1, M-2, M-3, or the 
monetary base? 
Similarly, when a theory tells us that something occurs with a lag should we lag the regressor one, 
four or ten periods? How can we find out what to do? The only answer is to try various definitions, lags, 
etc., and then to select the ones that give the best fit. 
Sometimes there is a simple solution which avoids the permissiveness that results from the 
standard data-mining practice. If you have large enough sample; break it into two parts, use one to 
formulate the appropriate form of the hypothesis and test that on the other part.  But in macroeconomics 
we usually do not have sufficient data for that. And in microeconomics where survey data with large 
samples are frequently available, this procedure, though feasible, is for some reason rarely used. That is 
hard to justify.
6 
  If it is not possible to use separate samples for specifying the hypothesis 
                                         
6 Another peculiarity of our accepted procedures, though one that does not increase the author’s leeway, is our readiness to 
accept the assumption that one’s data are normally distributed, even when working with a small sample. 
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and for testing it, the next best thing is to let the reader know about all the variants that you have fitted 
and the results thus obtained, so that she can decide how much credence to                             the 
results. For example, if I am told that the author’s hypothesis is confirmed when a particular regressor that 
is not well grounded in theory is included and when the regression is run in natural numbers but not in 
logs, I will know better than to accept it. We economists, or at least macroeconomists, tell the world 
about the importance of transparency, but do not practice it sufficiently.  
IV 
The culture in which the just-discussed permissive practices thrive is illustrated by what happened 
when a series of papers pointed out that our widely used software packages are not reliable - when fed 
identical data there can be a wide divergence in the results they give us. (See Lovell, 1994; McCullough 
and Viand, 1999, McCulough 2000,) Thus McCullough and Viand report on: 
the failure of many statistical packages to pass even rudimentary benchmarks 
for numerical accuracy. … Even simple linear procedures, such as calculation 
of the correlation coefficient can be horrendously inaccurate. … While all 
packages tested did well on linear regression benchmarks – gross errors were 
uncovered in analysis of variance routines. [There are] many procedures … for 
which we found discrepancies between packages: linear estimation with AR (1) 
errors, estimation of an ARMA model, Kalman filtering … and so on.  
(McCullough and Viand, 1999, pp. 633, 635, 650, 655) 
 
 
Since the just-cited paper appeared in the Journal of Economic Literature many economists 
must have read it. One might therefore have expected the journals to carry many short papers 
(perhaps in a special section for just such papers) reporting on the sensitivity of the regressions they 
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had previously published in that journal. At the least, subsequently published papers should have 
discussed whether, and if so how, their results differ depending on the computer programs used. 
Since neither of these things happened (mea culpa) it is hardly surprising that we also tolerate 
procedures that allow researchers to impose their wishes on the data.  
              So far I have talked only about econometric practice. But theory, too, has its undesirable 
short-cuts. One in welfare economics is to ignore the theory of the second best. Another is to 
confound utility maximization with income maximization. A third is a casual dismissal of any concern 
with the realism of assumptions. If questioned about this an economic theorist is likely with a superior 
smile to refer the questioner who committed this faux pas to Friedman’s (rightly) celebrated 
methodological essay, thereby ignoring all the criticisms and qualifications that Friedman’s essay has 
drawn. A fourth short-cut is to employ the basic principle of rational-expectations theory, that on 
average agents have correct expectations, since people do not continue to make the same mistake 
time after time. But that is a long way from being able to claim that during a specific period, say 
2007.1 to 209.I individual errors washed out and on average expectations were rational 
V  
   It is not surprising that our mores show certain tenderness towards researchers by providing 
loopholes for them. A soft science such as economics is more prone to such permissiveness than is a 
hard science, because it is in any case much harder to definitively establish or refute hypotheses. 
Moreover, if a subject as difficult as economics uses criteria that do not provide some loopholes many 
fewer papers would be published, since many if not most economic research projects would fail. One 
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might then expect an economist at a research university to publish only perhaps one or two papers 
per decade. Try explaining that to a dean. I am not denying that our journals use tough criteria - I 
have had too many papers rejected to doubt that. But their criteria are ones that require extensive 
and difficult work, such as the application of the latest econometric techniques and math, while 
providing loopholes that allow researchers to claim that they have reached reliable results when their 
unavoidable use of a flawed procedure, such as data mining, makes that doubtful. 
 Just what determines which errors are permitted and which not, is hard to say, but certain 
conventional errors become established, perhaps in some cases by the historical accident that an 
outstanding economist made this particular error, or by referees believing that this particular error is 
unavoidable, or perhaps not noticing it. 
Suppose a paper with an erroneous procedure, e. g., confusing statistical with economic 
significance, does get into the literature. This tends to make another economist less leery of also 
using this procedure; after all, if others think that it is alright, perhaps it is, and even if you still 
believe that it is not, the protests of your conscience are likely to be less vehement if you can point to 
others who do the same thing. Moreover, the more a certain questionable procedure is used, the less 
likely it is that a referee, who perhaps used it himself, will object, or that the reader will form a bad 
opinion of you. As Alexander Pope put it (Bartlett, 1980, p. 337): 
Vice is a monster of such frightful mien 
As to be hated needs but to be seen 
             Yet seen too oft, familiar with the face 
            We first endure, then pity, then embrace.  
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However this does not mean that over time the standards of economics will inevitably decline                      
, because as readers come across a certain mistake more often, there is a greater chance that 
someone will catch it, and it also becomes a more valuable target for a critical paper. There is 
therefore also a tendency for Invalid procedures to be eliminated. For example, we are now much 
more careful about assuming that expectations are invariant with respect to government policies, or 
that the government does not face a budget constraint, and more cautious in attributing causation to 
mere correlation, then we were forty years ago. Similarly, while some years ago R
2’s of over 0.9 
were common, we are now usually aware enough of the dangers of spurious correlation to avoid such 
claims.
7 Moreover, in recent years economists have become more aware of the danger of data 
mining, and more papers report on fragility tests, although still to a lesser extent than seems 
appropriate. I suspect that in the race between errors becoming acceptable and errors being exposed, 
the latter has won out in recent years. Economics is improving, albeit at a slow rate. even when 
measured, not by the elegance of our techniques, but by what we know about how the economy 
operates, But that does not mean that new errors do not from time to time gain a foothold. 
VI 
Does the use of readily available of loopholes imply that economists are dishonest? In one 
sense it does not. The typical economist is not consciously cheating, and is using procedures that are 
                                         
7 Indeed there is now the opposite danger of accepting results based on very low R
2’s. A regression that “explains” only 10 
percent of the variance of the dependent variable faces the danger that some of the omitted variables that explain the other 90 
percent are correlated with one or more of the regressors used, so that the regression coefficients are biased.  
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sanctified by common practice, and that he usually thinks are valid. But in another sense we 
economists collectively are cheating, because we accept practices that we would admit are 
questionable if we were forced to confront this issue outright. Once one takes account of group-think 
there is no contradiction between individuals behaving honestly, and yet the combination of these 
individuals being less than honest and forthright, Just another   example of the aggregation problem.  
VII 
Is this problem worse in economics than in other fields? To answer this question adequately 
would require substantial knowledge of several fields, knowledge that I do not possess. But 
nonetheless I cannot just ignore this question because it is so basic in evaluating the extent to which 
economists are honest.  
Physicists seem more willing than economists to admit error. That is hardly surprising since 
their hypotheses can be confirmed or disconfirmed much more definitively than can economic 
hypotheses. Economics should be appraised by comparison not with the top of the pyramid, but less 
elevated fields, such as psychology and geology 
Ziliak and McCloskey’s discussion of the way psychologists use significance tests, as well as 
some discussion within psychology, suggest that psychologists are just as ready to misuse 
significance tests as are economists.
8 In biology Peter Lawrence (2003) complains that “it has 
become profitable to ignore or hide results that do not fit with the story being sold”. And in biometric 
                                         
8 Indeed, there has been an` albeit unsuccessful` attempt to ban the use of significance tests in the journals published by the 
American Psychological Association.  
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research, according to John Ioannidis (2005), “conflicts of interest are very common … and typically 
they are inadequately and sparsely reported”. In addition, he argues, the bias introduced by 
commitment to a particular hypothesis may distort reported results and their interpretations. 
Furthermore,  “[p]restigious investigators may suppress via the peer review process the appearance 
and dissemination or findings that refute their findings.” More specifically, Ioannidis complains, as do 
Ziliack and McCloskey (2008), about the overemphasis in medical research on statistical significance, 
and also about the bias that result from repeated testing. All in all, “there is a widespread notion that 
in medical research false findings may be the majority or even the vast majority of research claims” 
(Ioannisis, 2005)
9. And as for philosophers, the lovers of knowledge and wisdom, an outstanding 
philosopher, Robert Nozick (1974, p. xiii italics in original), reports that: 
One form of philosophical activity feels like pushing and shoving things 
to fit into some perimeter of specified shape. All those things are lying out 
there, and they must be fit in. You push and shove the material into the rigid 
area: getting it into the boundary on one side, and it bulges out on another. … 
So you push and shove and clip off corners from the things so that they’ll fit 
and you press in until finally almost everything sits unstably more or less in 
there, what doesn’t  gets heaved far away so that it won’t be noticed. (Of 
course, it’s not all that crude. There is also the coaxing and cajoling. And the 
body English.) Quickly you find an angle from which it looks like an exact fit 
and take a snapshot. … All that remains is to publish the photograph as a 
representation of exactly how things are, and to note how nothing fits properly 
into any other shape. 
 
                                         
9 For other criticisms of medical research and its popularizations see Goldacre (2008)  
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VIII 
That certain fields are no better in this respect  than economics does not imply that we should cease 
trying to improve the integrity of economics. But how? An obvious answer is to foster in our day-to-
day activities a climate of greater humility, to admit that our methods are imperfect and our results 
less compelling than they seem. This would make us more willing to admit that some of our 
procedures are open to doubt, and more willing to challenge prevailing practices. It should also make 
us less prone to group-think.  
Turning to more specific remedies, journals have in recent years cut back sharply on the 
number of critical comments on the papers they publish. The inauguration of an electronic journal, 
Economic Journals Watch, devoted entirely to critical comments on published papers, has taken up 
only part of the slack, and the resulting reduction in the probability that an error will be caught is 
undesirable. To be sure, if journals were to go back to publishing more critical comments that would 
mean admitting that a journal’s referees and editor are not omniscient, and also by cutting back on 
the space available for original papers would tend to reduce the journal’s citation ranking, but these 
prices are well worth paying. It would also help if journals would enforce more strictly the requirement 
that authors make their data and computer programs available, and if referees would ask authors to 
do more robustness tests, including tests using alternative computer programs. 
 More checking of published results would also help to make outright fraud more risky, though 
its main benefit would probably be more to reduce carelessness than outright dishonesty. Graduate 
econometrics courses could require students to check a published paper, and this effort could perhaps 
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be underwritten by NSF grants. Data mining could be disciplined to some extent by requiring authors 
who use time series data to publish after, say 3 years, a brief note discussing whether their results 
still hold when you add three more years’ data. Authors who use data that are subsequently revised, 
such as GDP data, could be asked to report whether the fit of their regressions improves – or 
deteriorates when the revised data are used. 
How about a code of ethics? I doubt that it would help with the problems of academic research 
that I have focused on, but it would help government economists and business economists, as well as 
economists working for think tanks, to stand up to demands that their research generate  the 
preferred answer. Would establishing a set of best practices help? It probably would in the short run, 
but there is the danger that by setting certain practices in concrete it would  it would inhibit progress 
in the long run. 
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